Legal FAQ

Filing isn’t limited to high earners — under Section 114 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, it is also triggered by things like owning specified property or a vehicle, holding an NTN, or belonging to certain professional or chamber bodies, regardless of income level.

Mandatory filers include every company; individuals whose taxable income exceeds the tax-free threshold; owners of immovable property or flats above specified size thresholds; owners of a motor vehicle above 1000cc; anyone who already holds a National Tax Number; members of chambers of commerce or professional bodies; and anyone claiming a loss carry-forward or who filed a return in either of the two preceding years. FBR sets an annual filing deadline (commonly 30 September for most individuals and AOPs) but frequently extends it by public notice — for Tax Year 2025 it was pushed to 31 October 2025.

Any person making a taxable supply in Pakistan — including manufacturers, importers, wholesalers, distributors, and retailers or service providers above the applicable turnover threshold — must register under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.

Registration is completed through FBR’s Iris / Central Registration system, after which a Sales Tax Registration Number and Certificate of Registration are issued. FBR’s guidance provides turnover-based exemptions for very small manufacturers and retailers, but the exact rupee thresholds are revised periodically through Finance Acts, so the current figure should always be confirmed with FBR or counsel before relying on it. Once registered, a business must charge, collect, and periodically file sales tax returns.

FBR audits are triggered either through computerized random or parametric balloting under Section 214C, or by an individual Commissioner’s selection under Section 177, after which the taxpayer must produce books of accounts, documents, and records for examination.

Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 gives the Commissioner Inland Revenue power to call for records and conduct the audit; Section 214C is the underlying selection mechanism, which FBR describes as risk-based and targeted at high-risk cases. The taxpayer receives notice and an opportunity to respond before any amended assessment is finalized. An unfavorable audit-based assessment can then be challenged through the normal appeal process.

The first appeal goes to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) within 30 days of the order, and if still unsatisfied, a further appeal lies to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) within 60 days of the Commissioner (Appeals)’ decision.

An appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) must be filed on a prescribed form with a filing fee, and is not maintainable unless the tax due on the amount declared in the return has already been paid. The tax demand generally remains recoverable during the appeal unless a stay is granted. The Appellate Tribunal is the final fact-finding forum; beyond it, an aggrieved party may file a reference to the High Court, but only on a point of law.

Yes — the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 designates many payers as “withholding agents” (for example, employers on salary under Section 149, and payers of goods, services, or contracts under Section 153) who must deduct tax when payment is made and deposit it with FBR.

Withholding covers a wide range of transactions — salary, contractor and supplier payments, rent, dividends, imports, and more — each with its own section and rules. Withholding agents must issue tax deduction certificates, deposit withheld amounts within the prescribed time, and file periodic withholding statements, generally quarterly under Section 165. Non-compliance exposes the withholding agent to penalties and potential personal liability for the unpaid tax.

Any manufacturer or importer of goods listed as excisable in the First Schedule to the Federal Excise Act 2005 — for example cigarettes, cement, and sugary drinks, plus certain services like air travel and telecom — must register with FBR and file monthly returns.

Registration is required for each factory or premises producing, importing, or supplying dutiable goods or excisable services. The regime is self-assessed, with no prior FBR clearance needed, but duty on a month’s clearances is due by the 15th of the following month. Registered persons can generally adjust FED already paid on inputs against duty owed on finished excisable output, provided they hold valid purchase invoices and paid through banking channels. The list of excisable items and rates changes almost every Finance Act, so current-year figures should always be checked before relying on them.

Imports attract several layered charges collected together at the port: customs duty under the Customs Act 1969, sales tax on the customs-assessed value, income tax withheld as an advance tax, and, for specific goods, additional or regulatory customs duty.

Customs duty is set by tariff heading (HS code) on the assessed value; sales tax is then calculated on value plus duty. Income tax withheld at import is generally adjustable against the importer’s annual return. Additional or regulatory duty may be added by government notification on particular goods. Rates change frequently via Finance Acts and SROs, so an importer should verify the current rate for their specific HS code before clearing goods, typically through FBR’s WeBOC customs system.

Late filing drops you off the Active Taxpayers List (ATL) for that year, which triggers much higher withholding tax on banking, vehicle, and property transactions, and requires paying a Section 182A surcharge to be restored.

FBR publishes the ATL annually; filing after the due date excludes a taxpayer from it, and restoration requires paying the Section 182A surcharge, an amount that differs by individual, association of persons, or company and is revised through Finance Acts — so the current figure should be confirmed before relying on it. Non-ATL status can also block carrying forward business losses for that year and forfeits refund-delay compensation for the period spent off the list.

Gain on the sale of immovable property is taxed as a capital gain under Section 37 of the Income Tax Ordinance, and separately both buyer and seller have advance tax withheld at transfer under Sections 236K and 236C, with rates depending heavily on the seller’s and buyer’s filer status.

At transfer registration, the purchaser has advance tax withheld under Section 236K and the seller under Section 236C, both calculated on the higher of the declared price or the applicable FBR/DC valuation, and generally adjustable against final tax liability for active filers. Non-filers and late filers face materially higher withholding under both sections. The rules on holding-period-based capital gains rates have changed in recent years and reset frequently through Finance Acts, so the current mechanism for a specific property should be verified with a tax professional.

A refund is claimed by filing an e-refund application through FBR’s Iris system under Section 170, and FBR must decide the claim within 60 days; if payment is delayed beyond three months from when the refund becomes due, compensation is payable under Section 171.

Refunds require electronic filing — a manual return alone does not create entitlement to one. The Commissioner first offsets any excess against other tax due, then refunds the remaining balance, issuing a written decision within 60 days of the claim. If payment is delayed past three months, compensation accrues on the outstanding amount. Refunds are generally blocked for periods during which the taxpayer was off the Active Taxpayers List.

A writ petition is an application under Article 199 of the Constitution asking a High Court to order a government official, authority, or body to act — or stop acting — lawfully, but generally only if no other adequate legal remedy exists.

Article 199(1) allows a High Court, if satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law, to direct a person performing functions connected with the Federation, a Province, or a local authority to refrain from an unlawful act or perform a legally required one, or to declare an act taken without lawful authority as of no legal effect. Because this is an extraordinary constitutional remedy, courts generally expect a petitioner to have exhausted other effective statutory or departmental remedies first, and the matter must fall within the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction.

Article 199 lets a High Court restrain unlawful official action or declare it void, order that a detained person be produced, require a public-office holder to show their authority to hold it, and issue directions to enforce fundamental rights.

Clause (1)(a) covers orders directing an official to stop an unauthorized act or perform a legally required one, or declaring an act done without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Clause (1)(b) covers production of a person in custody and requiring a public-office holder to justify their authority. Clause (1)(c) allows directions for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights under Chapter 1 of Part II. Lawyers commonly describe this relief using the traditional common-law labels — mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, quo warranto — as shorthand for the substance of these clauses, though those Latin terms do not themselves appear in the constitutional text.

Article 199(1)(c) lets any aggrieved person ask a High Court for directions against a government or authority to enforce a Fundamental Right under Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution, and Article 199(2) protects the right to do so from being abridged.

Fundamental Rights are set out in Articles 8–28, and Article 8 declares any law inconsistent with them void to the extent of the inconsistency. Article 199(1)(c) gives the High Court power to issue directions to any person or authority, including a Government, for enforcement of these rights within its territorial jurisdiction. Article 199(2) further protects this by stating that the right to move a High Court for enforcement of Fundamental Rights shall not be abridged, subject to the Constitution.

It means a High Court examining whether a government official or authority acted within its lawful powers, and if not, declaring that action void and of no legal effect.

Under Article 199(1)(a)(ii), a High Court may declare that an act done or proceeding taken by a person performing functions connected with the Federation, a Province, or a local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of no legal effect. This is the constitutional foundation for judicial review of administrative and government action in Pakistan, letting an aggrieved party challenge decisions that exceed legal authority.

A quo warranto petition asks the High Court to question a person’s legal right to hold a specific public office — not how well they are doing the job, but whether they were lawfully appointed to it at all.

Under Article 199(1)(b)(ii), a High Court can call on a public office holder to show the legal authority for holding that office, and remove them if none exists — for example, where an appointment to a statutory post bypassed the eligibility criteria or process the law requires. Unusually for a writ, the petitioner need not prove personal injury; courts still examine the petitioner’s good faith before granting relief, but standing is broader than for an ordinary Article 199(1)(a) petition.

Yes, through a stay order or interim injunction, but Article 199(4A) caps most such interim orders against government action affecting state property, public revenue, or scheduled laws at roughly twelve months total.

Courts generally grant interim relief where there is a prima facie case, risk of irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favors a pause. For interim orders affecting laws in the Constitution’s First Schedule, state property, or public revenue, Article 199(4A) provides that such an order lapses after six months unless extended once more for up to six months, and the underlying case must be decided on its merits within that window — a safeguard against indefinite stays freezing government action.

Article 199 is the High Court’s writ jurisdiction for individual grievances against government action; Article 184(3) lets the Supreme Court act directly only where a case raises a genuine question of public importance tied to enforcement of a fundamental right.

Most disputes with a government department — a denied license, an unlawful transfer, unlawful detention — belong in the High Court under Article 199, where the petitioner generally must be a directly aggrieved person with no other adequate remedy available. Article 184(3) is reserved for matters of public importance rather than merely private wrongs, and in practice the Supreme Court invokes it sparingly; for routine disputes, the relevant High Court is the correct first forum.

There is no fixed statutory limitation period for Article 199 petitions, but a High Court can still refuse relief for unreasonable delay under the equitable doctrine of laches.

The Limitation Act, 1908 does not prescribe a specific time limit for constitutional petitions, so each High Court weighs delay on the facts of the case. Courts have generally held that laches will not bar a petition where the challenged action is void from the outset or taken without lawful authority, since limitation does not run against a nullity. In practice, unexplained delay in challenging a routine order remains one of the more common reasons a petition is dismissed at the admission stage, so a petition should generally be filed as promptly as possible.

Yes — an intra-court appeal (ICA) lets a party appeal a single judge’s Article 199 order to a larger bench of the same court; its legal basis is Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, rather than a specific constitutional article.

An intra-court appeal is narrower than an ordinary appeal, generally limited to correcting a clear error on the record rather than re-arguing the whole case, and is typically unavailable where the underlying proceedings already had a statutory appeal, revision, or review route before the writ petition was filed, or against a purely interlocutory order.

Generally no — Article 199 writs run against the state, government authorities, statutory bodies, or persons performing functions connected to federal, provincial, or local government, not against purely private parties.

For disputes with a private company or individual that involve only private-law rights, such as an ordinary contract or private property dispute, the High Court will direct the parties to the ordinary civil courts instead. A narrow exception can exist where a private entity performs a public or statutory function, or where a body with substantial state control is involved — but even then, if the underlying relationship is purely contractual, courts have generally held Article 199 does not apply.

A civil suit is started by presenting a plaint — the written claim — to the civil court with jurisdiction, as required by Section 26 and Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Under Section 9 CPC, civil courts may try all suits of a civil nature unless a law expressly or impliedly bars them. Order VII Rule 1 requires the plaint to state the parties, the facts giving rise to the claim and when it arose, why the court has jurisdiction, the relief sought, and the suit’s value for court-fee purposes. Once admitted, the court issues summons to the defendant, who files a written statement; the court then frames issues, records evidence, and delivers judgment and decree. A losing party generally has a right of appeal from an original decree under Section 96 CPC.

There is no single deadline — the Limitation Act, 1908 fixes a different period for each type of claim, for example three years for breach of contract and twelve years to recover possession of immovable property after dispossession.

The First Schedule to the Act lists the period and the date it starts running for each kind of suit. Article 115 gives three years for compensation for breach of contract, running from when the contract is broken. Article 142 gives twelve years for a suit to recover possession of immovable property after dispossession. Where no specific article applies, Article 120 provides a residual six-year period from when the right to sue accrues. Section 3 requires a court to dismiss a suit filed late even if the opposing party never raises limitation as a defence — which is why checking the applicable period early matters.

By filing a civil suit — typically for declaration of title, possession, and/or injunction — in the civil court within whose local limits the property is situated.

Section 16 CPC requires suits for recovery of immovable property to be filed where the property is located, and Order VII Rule 3 requires the plaint to describe the property, with boundaries or survey/settlement numbers where possible. An owner who has been dispossessed generally has twelve years from the date of dispossession to sue for recovery under Article 142 of the Limitation Act. Courts decide such disputes on documentary title, revenue records, and other evidence, with appeal rights under Section 96 CPC; declaratory or injunctive relief is commonly sought alongside such suits under the Specific Relief Act, 1877.

The winning party (decree-holder) files an execution application under Order XXI of the CPC, and the court can enforce the decree by delivery of property, attachment and sale, arrest and detention, or appointing a receiver.

Section 51 CPC lists the enforcement methods available to the executing court, and Order XXI sets out the machinery in detail, including which property is liable to attachment under Section 60, and how a decree can be transferred to a court in another district for execution. Section 48 CPC generally bars a fresh execution application filed more than six years after the date of the decree, subject to limited exceptions — so timely follow-through after winning a case matters.

Yes — under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a court can grant a temporary injunction restraining a party from selling, transferring, dispossessing, or otherwise interfering with property in dispute while a civil suit is pending.

Courts apply three settled tests before granting one: a prima facie case, balance of convenience in the applicant’s favor, and irreparable loss that money cannot compensate. A court may first grant a short ad-interim injunction without hearing the other side, then confirm, vary, or vacate it after hearing both parties. Injunctions are discretionary rather than automatic, and the opposing party can apply to have them discharged and can challenge them on appeal.

An appeal under Section 96 and Order XLI CPC is a right to have a decree fully re-examined on facts and law by the next higher court; a revision under Section 115 CPC is a narrower, discretionary remedy to the High Court, available only where no appeal lies and the lower court acted without jurisdiction, exceeded it, or acted illegally or with material irregularity.

An appeal from a Civil Judge’s decree generally goes to the District Court, while an appeal from a decree passed by a District Judge in original jurisdiction goes to the High Court. A revision petition is filed directly with the High Court, but it does not reopen questions of fact — it is confined to jurisdictional or legal errors rather than re-weighing evidence.

You can file an ordinary civil suit for recovery of money, or, where the claim is based on a negotiable instrument like a cheque or promissory note, or is a clear liquidated sum, a faster summary suit under Order XXXVII CPC.

Under Order XXXVII, the defendant has no automatic right to defend — they must apply for and be granted leave to defend within a short window after service, and if leave is refused, judgment is entered for the plaintiff without a full trial. This procedure runs only in courts the relevant High Court has specified. For informal loans or disputed accounts that don’t qualify for the summary route, the standard path is an ordinary recovery suit going through plaint, written statement, evidence, and judgment.

Under Sections 73 and 74 of the Contract Act, 1872, a party is entitled to compensation for loss that naturally arose from the breach or that both sides knew was likely to result — but the claimant must plead and prove the breach and the actual amount of loss, not just assert it.

Courts do not award damages automatically; the plaintiff must establish the contract, the breach, and the quantum of loss with evidence, and remote or indirect losses are generally not recoverable. Section 74 separately covers contracts with a pre-agreed penalty or liquidated-damages clause, letting the court award reasonable compensation up to that named sum without the same strict proof of actual loss. Damages are typically claimed within an ordinary civil suit, often alongside other relief.

If a defendant, though duly served, fails to file a written statement or appear, the court can proceed ex-parte under Order IX CPC and pass a decree in the plaintiff’s favor based on the unrebutted evidence.

A written statement is the defendant’s formal reply to the plaint; if none is filed within the time the court allows, the court may either grant more time or proceed against the defendant. Once service is proven and the defendant still does not appear, the court proceeds ex-parte. The defendant can later apply to set aside an ex-parte decree by showing summons was not properly served or that there was sufficient cause for non-appearance.

Yes — under the Court Fees Act, 1870, a plaint must carry a court fee before the court will accept it, and for most money and property suits the fee is ad valorem, calculated as a proportion of the claim’s value rather than a flat charge.

The Act sets different valuation rules by suit type: money suits by the amount claimed, land-possession suits by a multiple of annual revenue or profit, and declaration or injunction suits by the value the plaintiff assigns to the relief sought. If the fee paid is short, the court can direct that the deficiency be made up, and the plaint can be rejected if it isn’t. Exact rate schedules vary by province and are revised from time to time, so a plaintiff should confirm the current rate with a lawyer or the court’s fee office rather than relying on a fixed figure.

Post-arrest bail (Section 497 CrPC) is sought after a person is arrested or in custody; pre-arrest bail (Section 498 CrPC) is sought beforehand to prevent arrest, typically when the applicant fears arrest in a case believed to be false or malicious.

Section 497 governs release of a person already arrested or detained for a non-bailable offence, with bail generally refused if there are reasonable grounds the offence carries death, life imprisonment, or ten or more years’ imprisonment. Section 498 empowers the High Court or Sessions Court to direct that a person be admitted to bail and to fix or reduce bond amounts; Pakistani courts have long interpreted this section to permit anticipatory (pre-arrest) bail. An application typically goes first to the Sessions Court, then the High Court, with the outcome depending on the facts and discretion of the court.

An FIR (First Information Report) is the written record a police officer must make under Section 154 CrPC when informed of a cognizable offence, and it can be challenged and quashed by the High Court under its inherent powers (Section 561-A CrPC) in appropriate cases.

Section 154 requires that information about a cognizable offence, given orally or in writing, be reduced to writing, read back to the informant, signed, and entered in the police station register. Section 561-A preserves the High Court’s inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice — the basis used to quash FIRs, most often where mala fide intent, abuse of process, or a clear legal violation is shown. Quashment is not routine; courts generally require exceptional circumstances rather than merely disputed facts, and only the High Court can quash an FIR under Section 561-A.

A person convicted by a Sessions Judge may appeal the conviction to the High Court under Section 410 CrPC, while the State — or, with leave, a private complainant — may appeal an acquittal to the High Court under Section 417 CrPC.

Section 410 gives any person convicted by a Sessions or Additional Sessions Judge a right of appeal to the High Court. Section 417 allows the Provincial Government to direct the Public Prosecutor to appeal an acquittal, and a private complainant may seek special leave to appeal, or a person aggrieved by an acquittal may file within thirty days under a later sub-section. On appeal, the High Court re-examines the evidence on record rather than deciding the matter summarily; a related but distinct remedy, revision, follows its own separate limitation periods and procedure.

After an FIR is registered under Section 154 CrPC, police investigate under Sections 157–173 CrPC and submit a report to the Magistrate, after which the case proceeds to framing of charge and trial before the Magistrate’s or Sessions Court, depending on the offence.

Section 157 lets police begin investigating a cognizable offence directly from the FIR. Section 173 requires the investigation to be completed without unnecessary delay, with the results forwarded to the Magistrate in a prescribed report naming the parties and the evidence gathered. From there, the case is either sent for trial before a Magistrate or committed to the Court of Session for serious offences, where formal charges are framed and evidence is recorded. Bail, discharge, or quashment applications can arise at various points along this process.

An appeal is a statutory right to have a higher court re-examine a conviction, acquittal, or sentence on facts and law within a fixed time limit; a revision under Sections 435 and 439 CrPC is a discretionary remedy asking a court to check the legality, propriety, or regularity of a lower court’s order.

Revision powers are exercised by the Sessions Court and High Court to correct illegality or irregularity, not to re-weigh evidence the way an appeal does. A revisional court generally cannot convert an acquittal into a conviction and cannot enhance a sentence without first hearing the accused. Appeals carry a fixed limitation period, while revision has no single rigid deadline but must be filed without unreasonable delay; revision is typically used where no appeal lies, or to challenge a procedural or interlocutory order.

Yes — a private complaint is a written, signed application filed directly with a Magistrate under Chapter XVI of the CrPC; the Magistrate examines the complainant and witnesses under Section 200 CrPC and can proceed without any police-registered FIR.

The Magistrate records the complainant’s statement on oath, decides whether there is sufficient ground to proceed, and can summon the accused directly — an entirely separate track from the police/FIR system. This route is commonly used when police decline to register a case.

You can apply under Sections 22-A and 22-B CrPC to the Sessions Judge, sitting as Justice of the Peace, to direct the police to register the FIR.

These sections let the Justice of Peace check only whether the information discloses a cognizable offence on its face, not the truth of the allegation, and, if so, direct the police station to record it under Section 154 CrPC. They cannot decide guilt, add or delete charges, or interfere with the investigation itself. Pakistani courts have confirmed that registering an FIR for a cognizable offence is mandatory, and an unjustified refusal is itself unlawful.

In cognizable offences, police can arrest without a warrant and investigate on their own initiative; in non-cognizable offences, they cannot arrest without a warrant and generally need a Magistrate’s direction first.

Section 4 CrPC defines both terms, and a schedule lists each offence’s classification along with bail status and the trying court. More serious offences such as murder or robbery are typically cognizable, while lesser offences are often not — the specific classification of a given offence should always be checked rather than assumed.

You must be told the grounds of arrest, allowed to consult a lawyer of your choice, and produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours excluding travel time — you cannot lawfully be held longer without a Magistrate’s order.

These guarantees come from Article 10 of the Constitution. Warrantless arrest is lawful only in specified circumstances, such as reasonable suspicion in a cognizable case under Section 54 CrPC. Separate preventive-detention laws operate under a different constitutional regime and carry their own, distinct safeguards.

Only if the offence is legally compoundable under Section 345 CrPC; non-compoundable offences cannot be privately settled no matter what both sides agree, since the state treats them as offences against society.

Section 345 lists offences that can be compounded — some directly by the victim, others only with the court’s permission — leading to discharge or acquittal once the court is satisfied the compromise is voluntary. For non-compoundable offences, a genuine compromise between the parties may still be considered a mitigating factor at sentencing, even though it cannot end the case outright.

Talaq is the husband’s right to end the marriage by pronouncement followed by a mandatory notice and waiting process; khula is the wife’s court-supervised right to end the marriage, typically by returning her dower; judicial divorce (faskh) lets a wife ask a Family Court to dissolve the marriage on specific fault grounds.

Under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 (Section 7), a husband’s talaq must be notified in writing to the Union Council Chairman, triggering a 90-day Arbitration Council reconciliation period before it legally takes effect. The Supreme Court has held that a wife is entitled to khula as of right if she satisfies the court that reconciliation is impossible, even without her husband’s consent; under the Family Courts Act 1964 (Section 10), if pre-trial reconciliation in a khula suit fails, the court passes a dissolution decree, and the wife is generally directed to return the dower she received. Separately, the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 allows a wife to seek judicial divorce on defined grounds, such as cruelty, non-maintenance, or the husband’s disappearance, without necessarily forfeiting dower. Which route applies depends heavily on individual circumstances — this is a good example of where speaking with a lawyer directly matters.

Courts apply the “welfare of the minor” as the paramount standard under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 — traditional maternal-custody age guidelines exist but are not a fixed statutory rule and vary by school of thought.

The Guardians and Wards Act 1890 (Section 17) makes the child’s welfare the paramount consideration, and custody (day-to-day care) is legally distinct from guardianship (control over the minor’s property and affairs), which is presumptively the father’s. Commonly cited custody-age guidance — roughly age seven for sons and puberty for daughters under the Hanafi view — is a judicial starting presumption rather than a codified statutory age, and other schools of thought differ; courts routinely depart from it based on the specific child’s welfare. Because outcomes are fact-specific, this is an area where individual legal advice matters more than a general rule.

Maintenance suits are filed in the Family Courts, which can order interim monthly maintenance while the case is pending under Section 17A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964.

Section 17A lets the court fix interim maintenance payable by the 14th of each month; if the court does not set an annual increase, the amount automatically rises 10% yearly, and non-payment can result in the defence being struck off. The underlying substantive right derives from Muslim personal law rather than a single fixed formula, so amounts depend on the husband’s means and the family’s needs; a wife’s maintenance generally continues through her post-divorce iddat period.

Estates are distributed according to Islamic inheritance law under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962, but exact shares depend entirely on which relatives survive and, in some respects, the family’s school of thought.

The 1962 Act abolished customary practices that excluded women — particularly from inheriting agricultural land — and made Sharia the rule of decision. One specific, verifiable provision: Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 allows orphaned grandchildren to inherit a representative share of what their predeceased parent would have received, a provision that has been the subject of litigation over its scope. No generic inheritance fraction should be relied on without knowing the complete set of surviving heirs, which is why an inheritance calculation should always be done by a lawyer for the actual family situation.

Yes — Section 5 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 requires every nikah to be registered with a licensed Nikah Registrar appointed by the Union Council.

The Registrar records the marriage on the Nikah Nama and maintains the Union Council register; if the marriage is solemnized by someone else, that person is required to report it for registration. In practice this requires the CNICs or B-Forms of both parties and two adult witnesses, after which a computerized NADRA Marriage Registration Certificate can be obtained for visa, property, or other purposes. Unregistered marriages create serious evidentiary problems in later maintenance, custody, or inheritance disputes, which is why prompt registration matters.

Haq mehr is a sum the husband owes the wife under the nikah nama, split into “prompt” dower, payable on demand, and “deferred” dower, payable on divorce or death; unpaid dower is a debt recoverable through a Family Court suit.

Under Section 10 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, if the nikah nama does not specify the split between prompt and deferred dower, the law presumes the entire amount is payable on demand. The nikah nama registration form itself is meant to record the agreed mode of payment. A wife recovers unpaid dower by filing a suit before the Family Court under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964. There is no fixed or standard dower amount in law — it is whatever was agreed and recorded in that specific nikah nama, so it is worth confirming what your own document actually says.

It is a suit either spouse can file asking a Family Court to order a spouse who left without reasonable cause to resume married life; Pakistani courts cannot physically compel cohabitation, so its practical effect is limited.

Restitution of conjugal rights is listed among the matters within a Family Court’s exclusive jurisdiction. A husband facing a dissolution or maintenance suit may raise a restitution claim in his written statement instead of filing separately, and a wife facing such a suit may likewise counter-claim khula or dissolution in her written statement. In practice a decree is rarely enforced directly, but it can become relevant as evidence in related maintenance or dissolution disputes.

Yes — the appeal goes to the District Court or the High Court depending on the rank of the judge who decided the case, but a dissolution-of-marriage decree and interim orders generally cannot be appealed at all.

Under Section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964, if the Family Court judge held the rank of District Judge or Additional District Judge, the appeal lies to the High Court; otherwise, to the District Court. No appeal generally lies against a decree dissolving a marriage, other than under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939, or against an interim order. A minimum threshold below which certain dower or maintenance decrees cannot be appealed has also existed under this section, though the current applicable figure should be confirmed with a lawyer rather than assumed.

The husband must give written notice of the pronounced talaq to the Union Council Chairman, with a copy to the wife; the talaq only takes legal effect 90 days after that notice, during which an Arbitration Council must attempt reconciliation.

Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 requires notice to be given as soon as possible after pronouncement; failing to notify is itself a criminal offence. Within 30 days, the Chairman must form an Arbitration Council to attempt reconciliation between the spouses. The talaq does not take effect until 90 days after notice is delivered, or, if the wife is pregnant at the time, until the pregnancy ends if that is later — and this registration requirement applies regardless of which form of talaq was pronounced.

No — custody of the child and guardianship of the child’s property are legally distinct; property guardianship falls under the Guardian and Wards Act 1890, and selling or mortgaging a minor’s immovable property requires the court’s prior permission.

The Act allows courts to appoint a guardian of the person, of property, or both, and a custodial parent has no automatic power to sell a minor’s property purely by virtue of having custody. A property guardian is generally barred from mortgaging, selling, gifting, or granting a long lease of the minor’s immovable property without the court’s permission, which is granted only where necessary or clearly advantageous to the child. Applications are made to the District Court where the minor resides or the property is located.

Businesses can operate as a sole proprietorship, a partnership under the Partnership Act 1932, or a company — private limited, single-member, or public limited — incorporated with SECP under the Companies Act 2017; incorporation is now done online through SECP’s e-Services portal.

To incorporate, you first reserve a company name with SECP, then submit an incorporation application with the Memorandum and Articles of Association through SECP’s online portal. A private company needs a minimum of two members, a single-member company needs only one, and a public company needs at least three. Sole proprietorships and ordinary partnerships are not SECP-registered entities — they fall under the separate Partnership Act 1932 and are registered, if at all, with the provincial Registrar of Firms.

A partnership deed is the written agreement setting out each partner’s capital, profit and loss share, and duties; under the Partnership Act 1932, registering the firm with the Registrar of Firms is optional, but an unregistered firm loses important legal rights.

The Act does not compel registration, but an unregistered firm — and its partners — is generally barred from suing a third party or a fellow partner in court to enforce a contractual right, a restriction commonly attributed to Section 69 of the Act. Because of this, a clear written deed plus formal registration with the provincial Registrar of Firms is standard practice, and the deed itself serves as documentary proof of each partner’s agreed role in any later dispute. Partnership law is governed entirely separately from company law — the Companies Act 2017 does not apply to partnerships.

A private limited company must maintain a board of directors and officers, and file periodic statutory returns with SECP under the Companies Act 2017 — chiefly Form A (annual return) and Form 29 (changes in directors or officers).

Form A/B must be filed within 30 days of the AGM, giving a snapshot of directors, chief executive, company secretary, auditors, registered office, members, and share capital as of that date. Any change among directors, the chief executive, company secretary, or other listed officers must separately be reported on Form 29 within 15 days of the change. Certain small companies, such as single-member companies or private companies below a stated paid-up capital threshold, may be exempt from some filings. Persistent non-compliance can expose responsible officers to liability and can ultimately lead to the company being struck off SECP’s register.

Trademarks are registered with the Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan (IPO-Pakistan) under the Trademarks Ordinance 2001 — filing an application, undergoing examination, publication in the Trademark Journal, and a public opposition period before a certificate issues.

After an optional prior search, the applicant files an application with IPO-Pakistan, which examines it and raises any objections for response. If accepted, the mark is published in the Trademark Journal for a public opposition window of about two months, during which third parties may object; if unopposed, or if opposition is resolved favorably, a registration certificate is issued. Registration is valid for a set term — ten years from filing, per IPO-Pakistan — and is renewable thereafter.

Yes — the Companies Act 2017 allows a Single Member Company, a private limited company owned and directed by one person, giving a solo founder limited liability and a separate legal identity.

A Single Member Company is registered with SECP the same way as any private company, but has one member who is also sole director. Because there is only one director, the founder must nominate an individual, generally restricted to close relatives, to step in if the sole member dies or becomes incapacitated. It carries the same limited liability and perpetual succession as an ordinary private company and can later be converted to a multi-member company.

Yes — Pakistan permits up to 100% foreign shareholding in most sectors, and a foreign national or overseas Pakistani can be a shareholder or director of an SECP-registered company using a passport or NICOP, without needing a local partner.

Incorporation follows the same SECP process as for residents. Once shares are issued to a non-resident shareholder, this must be reported to the State Bank of Pakistan through an authorized dealer bank, which also governs repatriation of capital and dividends. This is distinct from the Board of Investment’s role, which specifically applies when a foreign company wants to open a branch or liaison office in Pakistan rather than incorporate a new, separately-owned Pakistani company. Sector-specific restrictions can still apply.

Under Section 204 of the Companies Act 2017, a director must act in good faith to promote the company’s objectives, exercise independent judgment and reasonable care, skill, and diligence, and avoid conflicts of interest.

The Act also bars directors from seeking undue personal gain, requiring repayment to the company if they do, and from accepting conflicting third-party benefits; a directorship itself is non-transferable. A director in breach, default, or negligence can be held personally liable, and SECP has enforcement powers including restrictions on defaulting directors.

A company can close voluntarily once its members pass a special resolution, a three-fourths majority vote, to wind up; a liquidator is then appointed to settle debts, dispose of assets, and apply for eventual dissolution.

Once the resolution passes, control shifts from the directors to the liquidator, who realizes assets, pays creditors, and distributes any surplus to shareholders. The company remains a legal entity, just under the liquidator’s control, until it is finally dissolved and struck off SECP’s register.

Both exist — you can sue in civil court, or, if your contract has an arbitration clause or you agree afterward, resolve it through arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 1940, which remains the governing domestic arbitration law.

Disputes with a written arbitration agreement go to a private arbitrator, with courts retaining supervisory functions such as appointing arbitrators and enforcing awards. Cross-border enforcement of foreign awards is separately governed by the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011. A draft arbitration bill aligned with modern international standards has been proposed to replace the 1940 Act, but it has not been passed by Parliament — the 1940 Act remains current law.

A joint venture agreement sets out how two or more businesses will jointly run a venture — shareholding, management control, funding, profit and loss sharing, and exit terms.

In Pakistan, a joint venture is either purely contractual or structured as a jointly-owned company under the Companies Act 2017. The agreement should cover board composition and voting rights, capital-call obligations, share-transfer restrictions, confidentiality and IP terms, and an exit or dissolution mechanism plus dispute resolution. There is no standalone joint venture statute — the terms rest on ordinary contract law and, where a company is formed, the Companies Act 2017.